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Abstract 
 
In recent years, outsourcing has gained considerable management attention. However, 
the benefits of outsourcing are not without concessions. One major risk is losing the 
flexibility to change the extent, nature, or scope of the outsourced business services, and 
such flexibility is strategically imperative in today’s dynamic business environment. This 
paper seeks to clarify the multi-dimensional notion of flexibility in outsourcing by 
examining robustness, modifiability, new capability, and ease of exit. Adapting from 
Evans (1991), we also develop a framework to classify existing practices in managing 
outsourcing flexibility. We go beyond contractual provision to surface a portfolio of 
pre-emptive, protective, exploitive, and corrective maneuvers. These strategic 
maneuvers map well to traditional notions in coordination theory, both in advanced 
structuring through loose coupling and dependency diversification, and in dynamic 
adjustment through proactive sensing and reactive adapting. We put forward a set of 
propositions hypothesizing the relationships between the various strategic maneuvers 
and the different dimensions of outsourcing flexibility, and discuss the moderating impact 
of such maneuvers on outsourcing success. We hope the greater conceptual clarity will 
not only contribute to the effectiveness of outsourcing management but also spawn a 
new research agenda on outsourcing flexibility.  
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Introduction 
 
                                                        
1 Robert Fichman was the accepting senior editor. Robert Zmud and Suzanne Rivard were the 
reviewers. This paper was submitted on March 15, 2005, and went through two revisions. 
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Introduction 
 
Outsourcing has gained considerable management attention since the 1980s. 
Traditionally, many non-core, information technology (IT) activities, such as desktop 
support, call centers, network operations, and application development have been 
relegated to external service vendors (see Cross, 1995; Clark et al., 1995; Lee et al., 
2003). Recent years have seen burgeoning business process outsourcing (BPO), which 
involves farming out non-core yet mission-critical business processes such as finance 
and accounting, human resources, and customer support to third-party service providers, 
often in offshore locations (Linder, 2004). IT largely enables the provision of such 
services, through web-based interfaces, extensive application support with commercial 
package software, such as SAP, and reliable network connections. With the promise of 
reduced cost, improved time to delivery, process streamlining, and strategic repositioning, 
many organizations have jumped onto the outsourcing bandwagon (Ang and Cummings, 
1997). British Petroleum’s outsourcing of finance and accounting to Accenture, for 
example, helped to speed up its post-merger integration of Amoco and Arco. Forecasts 
by the Gartner Group project strong growth in worldwide outsourcing spending. The IT 
outsourcing market continues to rise and is expected to hit $260 billion in 2009. Similarly, 
the current BPO market is estimated to climb from $111.3 billion in 2004 to $172 billion in 
2009, growing at a per-annum rate of close to 10%.  
 
However, the benefits of outsourcing are not without concessions. One major issue is the 
loss of flexibility, the ability to change the extent, nature, or scope of the business 
services that outsourcing delivers. Such flexibility in an outsourcing relationship is crucial 
to respond to uncertainty or to changing needs or requirements outside the provisions of 
the original outsourcing agreement. This is particularly pertinent in today’s competitive 
and dynamic environment, as flexibility is increasingly becoming a strategic imperative for 
business survival (Suarez et al., 1995).  
 
Traditionally, outsourcing flexibility is managed primarily through careful contracting, as 
management is often advised to craft short-term, airtight contracts to control for 
anticipated changes (Lacity, Willcocks, and Feeny, 1995; Fitzgerald and Willcocks, 1994; 
Saunder et al., 1997). Much of the literature dealing with flexibility in outsourcing 
arrangements emphasizes careful upfront contractual provisions. Harris et al. (1998) 
refer to the notion of contractual flexibility, the extent to which a contract contains bilateral 
adjustment mechanisms that allow ongoing adaptation to changing circumstances. Such 
a contract is typically characterized by variable pricing, short contract duration, modular 
contract structure, 2  a renegotiation or arbitration clause, premature termination 
conditions, and innovation incentives (see Table 1). Successfully negotiating more 
comprehensive flexibility provisions in such contracts should enhance outsourcing 
flexibility (Harrigan and Newman, 1990; Michell and Fitzgerald, 1997; Harris et al., 1998). 
 
However, given the static nature of contracts, there are limitations to using them as the 
sole means to achieve flexibility. This is partly due to the problem of incomplete 
contracting (Richmond et al., 1992), the inability to anticipate all changing conditions due 
to bounded rationality. In a constantly evolving environment, the cost of creating 
contracts with complete contingencies is prohibitively high, if not impossible. Consulting 
                                                        
2 Dividing major contract terms into separate components such that changes in one part will not 
affect the others, and demand less time and effort for ongoing adjustments. 
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Table 1. Flexible Contractual Provision in Outsourcing 
Contractual 
provision Clause Description 
Pricing 
Original contract price may be changed through 
(de)escalation mechanism (benchmarking, indexing, open 
pricing, etc.). 
Renegotiation Renegotiation clause enables some aspects of the contract to be changed during the life of the contract. 
Contract 
duration 
The parties may opt for a short or long contract. Shorter 
contracts are more flexible. 
Early 
termination 
A clause permitting premature termination of the contract, 
usually triggered by prescribed situations. 
Dispute 
resolution 
In case of dispute, parties may resort to arbitration or 
litigation. Arbitration is more flexible. 
Adjustment 
mechanisms 
Incentive 
contracting 
Links vendor payment to performance of the organization; is 
conducive to flexibility. 
Modular 
contract 
structure 
Separated 
contract terms 
Modular contract comprises a constellation of components 
(SLAs, strategic objective statements, continuous 
improvement mechanisms) affixed to a standard set of 
“master terms and conditions.” 
Note: Adapted from Harris et al. 1998 
 
reports have typically shown that contract drafting and negotiations take up considerable 
portions of the time and effort invested in outsourcing. Even then, their effectiveness is 
questionable, as the terms and conditions of a typical 5-to-10-year outsourcing contract 
often cannot respond to a dynamic business environment. As Barthelemy (2001) and 
Lacity and Willcocks (2001) show, many outsourcing arrangements have to be 
renegotiated because they cannot accommodate environmental uncertainty. Kern and 
Willcocks (2000) estimate that one in eight outsourcing deals is prematurely terminated. 
Other scholars have also blamed rigid contracts as a primary reason that many 
outsourcing efforts fail (Lacity and Hirschheim, 1993; Peisch, 1995; Lacity and 
Willcocks,1998). A well-crafted contract can only address the foreseeable flexibility 
required at the point of contracting but not the unanticipated business dynamism that 
emerges subsequently (see Figure 1).   
 
The issue is even more crucial in the context of BPOs, as such arrangements carry a 
great deal more complexity and uncertainty. These business processes are often critical 
and tightly coupled with other organizational processes. Their complexity arises from the 
simultaneous outsourcing of technological, workflow, and human resources. 
Idiosyncrasies in business processes also demand that a firm carefully balance a 
customized process to meet specific organizational needs against a standardized 
delivery process that, due to scale issues, makes vendors more efficient. In some cases, 
outsourcing services offshore introduces greater management and coordination risks, 
due to geographical dispersion and cultural differences. Managing outsourcing 
successfully in today’s dynamic environment can thus be daunting (Feeny et al., 2003). 
 
This paper investigates alternative strategies to managing outsourcing flexibility beyond 
traditional contracting. Besides comprehensive flexibility provisions in contracts, are there 
other mechanisms that organizations can deploy to enhance outsourcing flexibility? If so, 
how do they contribute to different dimensions of flexibility? 
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Figure 1. Contribution of Flexibility Maneuvers Beyond Careful Contracting 
 
In the following sections, we clarify the multi-dimensional notion of flexibility in 
outsourcing. We then introduce the conceptual framework proposed by Evans (1991), 
and elaborate on it in light of coordination theory (March and Simon, 1958; Gosain et al., 
2004) to surface a portfolio of strategic maneuvers to manage outsourcing flexibility. We 
also map managerial practices from the outsourcing literature onto the conceptual 
framework in order to hypothesize about the relationships between these strategic 
maneuvers and flexibility. Finally, we discuss how outsourcing flexibility moderates the 
negative relationship between environmental uncertainty and outsourcing success before 
concluding with implications for theory and practice. We hope that greater conceptual 
clarity will not only contribute to more effective outsourcing management, but also spawn 
a new research agenda on outsourcing flexibility. 
 
Flexibility Overview 
 
Flexibility is a key management concept, and has been extensively studied in different 
academic disciplines, such as strategic management (Sanchez, 1995; Volberda, 1996; 
Zaheer and Zaheer, 1997), manufacturing (Sethi and Sethi, 1990; Upton, 1994), and 
information systems (Avison et al., 1995; Eardley et al., 1997). Table 2 summarizes the 
key literature in these domains. Specifically, we rely on the synthesis of flexibility 
literature3 by Bahrami and Evans (2004) who have distilled these proliferated notions of 
flexibility into three key dimensions – robustness, modifiability, and new capability. We 
believe these dimensions are equally fitting in the outsourcing context. Given the 
inter-organizational context of outsourcing, we have also included a fourth dimension, 
ease of exit, to account for the inflexibility of being locked into a relationship
                                                        
3 Bahrami and Evans’s (2004) review is broad and covers disciplines such as military strategy, 
economics, manufacturing and operations management, strategic management, finance, 
information systems, and organizational science. 
Poorly-crafted contract  
with no alternative 
flexibility maneuvers 
Foreseeable 
change 
Unforeseeable 
change 
Well-crafted contract  
with no alternative flexibility 
maneuvers 
Well-crafted contract  
with alternative flexibility 
maneuvers 
Environmental Uncertainty 
Foreseeable 
change 
Foreseeable 
change 
Unforeseeable 
change 
Unforeseeable 
change 
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Table 2. Conceptualizations of Flexibility in Multiple Domains  
Flexibility 
dimensions Information Systems Manufacturing  Strategic Management 
Robustness  
 System robustness 
(Rosenhead et al. 1986) 
 Infrastructure flexibility 
(Duncan 1995; Byrd and Turner 
2000; Weill et al. 2002) 
 Open system (Allen and 
Boynton 1991; Chau and Tam 
1997) 
 
 Equipment flexibility (Parker 
and Wirth 1999) 
 Material flexibility (Jordan and 
Graves 1995; Carlsson 1989) 
 Volume flexibility (Jack and 
Raturi 2002) 
 Delivery flexibility (Sethi and 
Sethi 1990) 
 Program flexibility (Upton 1994) 
 Operational flexibility (DeGroote 
1994; Tushman and Anderson 1986) 
Modifiability  
 Technology flexibility (Brown 
and Hagel 2003; Prager 1996) 
 Software reusability 
(Nidumolu and Knotts 1998) 
 Mixed flexibility (Jack and 
Raturi 2002; Suarez et al. 1995) 
 Rerouting flexibility (Upton 
1994) 
 Changeover flexibility (Koste 
and Malhotra1999) 
 Process flexibility (Graves and 
Tomlin 2003) 
 Tactical flexibility (Carlsson 
1989) 
 Resource flexibility (Sanchez 
1995; Gargiulo and Benassi 2000) 
New capability  
 Software development 
flexibility (Nelson and Cooprider 
2001) 
 
 New product development 
flexibility (Gupta and Goyal 1989; 
Sieger et al. 2000) 
 Strategic agility/flexibility 
(Volberda 1996, Worren et al. 2002; 
Eppink 1978) 
 Dynamic capability (Teece et al., 
1997) 
Ease of exit 
 Inter-organizational system 
flexibility (Venkatraman 1994; 
Clark et al. 1995; Harrison 1994) 
 
 Market flexibility (Gerwin 1993, 
Sethi and Sethi 1990) 
 Partnering flexibility (Gosain et 
al. 2004) 
 
 Partnership adaptability 
(Venkatraman and Henderson 1998; 
Zaheer and Zaheer 1997) 
 Exit flexibility (Ybarra and 
Wiersema 1999; Harrigan and 
Newman 1990) 
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Bahrami and Evans (2004) note that to be truly flexible, an organization needs to 
embrace different dimensions of flexibility simultaneously—they term it “super-flexibility” 
(p. 19). The first dimension of flexibility is robustness, the ability to endure variations and 
perturbations, withstand pressure, or tolerate external changes. This relates to situations 
in which an organization (with its organic and physical components) has the built-in 
capacity to address uncertainty for varying levels of demand, product mix, and resource 
availability (Carlsson, 1989). As managers foresee changes, they can consciously build 
flexible mechanisms into the organization to address them, such as flexible 
manufacturing systems with a wide range of parameters or pre-programmed operations 
that accommodate daily fluctuations in production (Sethi and Sethi, 1990). 
 
The second dimension of flexibility is modifiability, the ability of an organization to make 
modifications (e.g., to adjust existing product attributes or alter service composition) to 
cope with less foreseeable events when they occur. In contrast to robustness, 
modification requires incremental but essential changes to the existing organization, such 
as altering existing business rules without major setup efforts (Jordan and Graves, 1995). 
 
The third dimension of flexibility, according to Bahrami and Evans (2004), addresses 
radical changes in the business environment that deviate substantially from projections. 
New capability is the ability to innovate in response to dramatic changes or novel 
situations. Such a “competence-destroying” discontinuity (Tushman and Anderson, 1986) 
may stem from competitors’ actions, changing consumer preferences, technological 
innovations, or new regulations and laws. Responding to such discontinuity involves 
radically transforming the existing organization to redefine a posture in the light of new 
imperatives, or to proactively create a new state of affairs (Sambamurthy et al., 2003; 
Venkatraman and Henderson, 1998), such as when a firm engages in developing new 
products when existing knowledge is no longer relevant. 
 
Although Bahrami and Evans (2004) discuss their conceptualization in the context of 
organizational flexibility, we believe the three dimensions of flexibility also apply in an 
outsourcing relationship. Outsourcing is an arrangement between firms where one 
supplies a set of business services to the other. Elements of such an arrangement 
include the business process – with its architectural design, established business rules 
and resource deployment (human, technical, organizational)—as well as the related 
formal and informal governance structures supporting the relationship. Inflexibility in the 
business services delivered through outsourcing can arise from both rigid processes (e.g., 
strict adherence to pre-defined procedures as a business process is designed and 
managed by the vendor) and rigid governance structures (e.g., a 10-year contract without 
provision for pricing or service level amendments).  
 
To cope with the dynamic environment, an outsourcing relationship should be capable of 
change or adaptation. Outsourcing flexibility is thus about the ability of an outsourcing 
relationship to change the extent, nature, or scope of business services delivered 
(adapted from definitions in prior literature, e.g., Sanchez, 1995; Carlsson, 1989; and 
Volberda, 1998). Often, it requires managing new and additional service requests beyond 
the initial contractual baseline, which could mean changes to the processes (e.g., 
alteration of business rules and addition of new functionality), the governance structures 
(e.g., contract renegotiation and vendor replacement), or some combination of these 
elements. As Lacity and Willcocks (2001) point out, three triggers often require 
adjustment or renegotiation in outsourcing: exceeding projected volume on existing 
services; changing the nature or composition of baseline services; and demanding 
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entirely new services. An outsourcing arrangement needs to build in sufficient capacity to 
tolerate, absorb, or endure transactional variation, without significant modification or 
re-deployment of resources. As organizational needs change, requests for changes in 
service composition make an existing outsourcing arrangement susceptible to 
modification. When a new set of business conditions arises altogether, an outsourcing 
arrangement should also be able to provide a new service capability. For example, 
midway through its outsourcing deal with EDS, the U.K. Inland Revenue was pressured 
by Parliament to implement a self-assessment tax scheme. It was the largest single tax 
reform of U.K. tax administration, and required an entirely new set of supporting functions 
from EDS (Lacity and Willcocks, 2001). 
 
Conceptualizing flexibility as robustness, modifiability, and new capability thus helps us 
clarify the different dimensions of flexibility in outsourcing. However, these notions relate 
to an existing relationship with an outsourcing vendor, which in itself could emerge as a 
flexibility issue (e.g., the possibility of being locked in). Changing the extent, nature, and 
scope of the outsourced business services may sometimes require the service provision 
to be transferred to other vendors or to be brought in-house, especially if such changes 
cannot be accommodated by the existing vendor. Hence, we include a fourth dimension 
of outsourcing flexibility to account for its inter-organizational context: ease of exit. This 
is the ability of an outsourcing relationship to allow transfer of services to other vendors or 
to be brought in house (Venkatraman and Henderson, 1998; Ybarra and Wiersema, 
2003). Gosain et al. (2004) term this ease of exit “partnering flexibility.” It differs from 
response to a volume spike, service feature alteration, or new functionality, as it requires 
assessing new vendors and re-building a new outsourcing relationship, and even 
re-establishing in-house capability.  
 
We believe that combining the four dimensions provides a holistic view of flexibility in 
outsourcing. Ideally, organizations want to manage an outsourcing arrangement to 
achieve high degrees of robustness, modifiability, readiness for new capability, and ease 
of exit. Depending on the situational business dynamism, managers need to enact and 
use different dimensions of flexibility. Table 3 summarizes these dimensions of 
outsourcing flexibility.  
 
Maneuvering for Flexibility: A Conceptual Framework 
 
In his field research on high-technology firms, Evans (1991) develops a conceptual 
framework encapsulating the strategic maneuvers to achieve flexibility. He proposes an 
archetypal framework based on the temporal and intentional orientations. The maneuvers 
can vary in “time,” as ex ante or ex post options. This suggests that flexibility can be 
planned and managed in advance, or it can be adjusted after a contract is sealed 
(Carlsson, 1989). The maneuvers can differ in their “intent,” or the degree to which 
organizations take an offensive or defensive stance toward flexibility (i.e., proactively 
creating and seizing an initiative, or defensively guarding against predatory moves). 
Offensive maneuvers attempt to control changes in the environment to gain competitive 
advantage, while defensive maneuvers strive to minimize the impacts of those changes. 
Such attempts to manage flexibility have also been described as active or passive 
(Eppink, 1978; Volberda, 1998).  
 
The conjunction of these two distinct yet interwoven orientations produces four archetypal 
maneuvers, which Evans (1991) categorizes as “pre-emptive,” “protective,” “exploitive,” 
and “corrective” (see Figure 2).  
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Table 3. Dimensions of Flexibility in Outsourcing 
Flexibility 
Dimension 
Meaning in 
outsourcing Description 
Robustness 
Variability of 
service 
capacity 
The ability of an outsourcing relationship to allow operational 
changes exceeding projected capacity on existing service 
delivery, i.e., service volume fluctuation, variations in 
standard user requests, urgent or special case processing, 
and exception handling 
Modifiability 
Alternation of 
service 
attributes 
The ability of an outsourcing relationship to allow alternation 
of attributes of its existing services in addressing changing 
business requirements, e.g., new configuration setup, 
alternation of processing workflow or business rules, new 
reporting requirements, and reference data updates. 
New 
capability 
Addition of 
innovative 
capability 
The ability of an outsourcing relationship to allow the addition 
of entirely new services to address radical changes or shifts 
in business paradigms, e.g., new government regulations, 
technological revamps, functional breakthroughs, and 
process innovations. 
Ease of exit  
Switch to 
another vendor 
or in-sourcing 
The ability of an outsourcing relationship to allow transfer of 
services to other vendors, or to be brought in-house, e.g., 
premature termination, vendor instability, or pricing 
disagreement or dispute.  
 
 
   
 Figure 2. Theoretical Foundation Behind Flexibility Maneuvers 
 
Organizations can equip themselves with the dexterity required for pre-emptive 
maneuvers before the nature of the contingency is known, consciously creating a range 
of options before they are needed (Rosenhead et al., 1986). Organizations can also use 
redundancy mechanisms, such as insurance or resource buffers, as a protective 
Advanced Structuring  Dynamic Adaptation 
Offensive 
Outsourcing 
Contracting 
Defensive 
After Before 
   Preemptive 
 
Loose Coupling 
Coordination Theory 
   Protective 
 
   Dependency  
  Diversification 
    Exploitive 
 
Proactive Sensing 
    Corrective 
 
   Relationship 
    Building 
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measure to guard against a potentially damaging situation and to allow a strategy to 
remain viable in spite of changes in the environment. Ex post managerial capability to 
exploit or capitalize on unexpected opportunities through constant scanning of the 
business horizon, and the ability to recover from infliction and ameliorate the impacts of 
accidents and mistakes are also critical to flexibility. 
 
The framework is probably more empirically driven, as Evans himself (1991, p.76) 
acknowledges, but the insights are consistent with the theoretical arguments in 
coordination theory (March and Simon, 1958; Gosain et al., 2004). Outsourcing can be 
seen as a complex coordination problem, requiring the management of an aggregation of 
diverse activities, resources, and systems (Malone and Crowston, 1994). In such 
situations of interdependence, concerted actions come about through coordination. 
Organizations seek to consciously lay out prescribed activities by planning in advance, 
but meanwhile, they supplement these with spontaneous ongoing adjustment to cope 
with unforeseen scenarios (Beekun and Glick, 2001). Coordination may thus be based on 
advanced structuring, or coordination by plan, and dynamic adjustment, or coordination 
by feedback.  
 
Advanced structuring can involve either reducing task interdependence through loose 
coupling, or mitigating resource dependency by diversifying resource allocations (March 
and Simon, 1958). Loose coupling reduces the need to coordinate information exchange 
and flow in a dyadic relationship, while dependency diversification generates alternative 
options to mitigate overdependence on critical resources. Dynamic adjustment is 
achieved by enhancing feedback in a changing environment through sensing and 
adapting (Sambamurthy et al., 2003). It can be seen as a two-pole strategy. In sensing 
capability, through feedback, quick learning, and constant environmental 
scanning—IT-supported or otherwise—organizations become more informed and 
forward-looking, and have more time to adapt. In adaptive capability, organizations 
emphasize proactive sensing less but seek ways to quickly react to or recover from 
shocks. As we will discuss later, in outsourcing, the ability to build strong relationships 
with vendors is central to quick adaptation. 
 
Conceptually, the notions of advanced structuring and dynamic adjustment in 
coordination theory align with the temporal orientation of Evans’ flexibility maneuvers, 
corresponding to the difference between ex ante and ex post. In addition, the different 
emphases on sensing and adapting map onto the offensive–defensive differentiation of 
“intent” in Evans’ framework (Alexander, 1995). This integration of coordination theory 
and Evans’ framework forms the basis of our research model, with coordination concepts 
(loose coupling, dependency diversification, proactive sensing, and reactive adapting) 
forming the key themes for pre-emptive, protective, exploitive, and corrective maneuvers, 
respectively (see Figure 2).  
 
Strategic Maneuvers for Flexibility 
 
Loose Coupling as a Pre-Emptive Maneuver 
 
Loose coupling is a dialectical concept that emphasizes the simultaneous existence of 
rationality and indeterminacy in a system (Orton and Weick, 1990). Loose coupling 
implies elements that are linked (coupled) to preserve some degree of determinacy. At 
the same time, these elements are subject to spontaneous change, leading to some 
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degree of independence (looseness). Loose coupling reduces interdependencies, 
allowing task components to more easily deal with change. It also makes it easier for 
them to disentangle and recombine into new configurations. Creating flexibility involves 
structuring information and interface linkages to loosely couple interacting components 
(Gosain et al., 2004; Beekun and Glick, 2001). A review of management practices with 
strong theoretical foundations and empirical research in the outsourcing literature reveals 
three strategic maneuvers that manifest such characteristics: minimizing customization, 
enhancing process maturity, and leveraging vendors’ interoperability.  
 
Minimizing Customization 
 
The need to customize arises when there are non-trivial incompatibilities between a 
vendor’s offerings and an organization’s idiosyncrasies. Some organizations have to 
customize their vendors’ generic processes to fulfill their needs and differentiate 
themselves (Quinn and Hilmer, 1994; Zaheer and Venkatraman, 1995), resulting in 
complex exchanges of information with vendors. Minimizing customization is important in 
structuring the outsourcing relationships, as limited customization reduces the extent to 
which market exchange is personalized, and limits the scope for moral hazard, shrinking, 
and opportunistic behavior (Williamson, 1985). Adhering to generic vendor offerings 
allows for effective management of interdependencies, making the infrastructure more 
capable of supporting change.  
 
Heavy customization makes it difficult to use vendors’ generic capability, which is 
perhaps ironically the reason why many processes are outsourced in the first place (Light, 
2001). It also hinders an organization’s ability to leverage vendors’ production cost 
advantages or common resources (Levina and Ross, 2003; Ybarra and Wiersema, 1999). 
The customization issue is particularly pertinent considering the vendors’ general 
reluctance to accede to individual organizational change requests. Lacity and Willcocks 
(2001) highlight the outsourcing deal between British Aerospace (BAe) and Computer 
Science Corporation (CSC), in which CSC was contractually prevented from 
standardizing data centers and computing platforms to cater to the idiosyncratic service 
requirements of each division of BAe. This customization hampered BAe’s ability to 
respond quickly to external changes, as each new service request was subject to 
excessive charges and delay.  
 
Enhancing Process Maturity  
 
Process maturity refers to the extent to which embedded knowledge in managing, 
operating, and controlling a process has been captured or made explicit (Harter et al., 
2000). Reflecting the progressive notions of the capability maturity model in software 
development (Paulk et al., 1993), McCormack and Johnson (2001) propose a process 
maturity model representing a continuum of increasing maturity, from being “anecdotal,” 
“planned and tracked,” “defined and measured,” “standardized and automated,” to 
“continuously improved.” This model helps to assess how well management consciously 
surfaces, rationalizes, and routinizes embedded knowledge in processes before 
outsourcing them. The better the embedded knowledge of the processes is captured, 
either through documentation or automated routines, the easier it is to transfer such 
knowledge to other parties, and the faster a process can be modified or reconfigured to 
respond to external changes. The best candidates for outsourcing are the processes at 
the top of the maturity spectrum, as they are understood well enough to be standardized, 
automated, or digitized to easily “plug and play” with other processes, or connect to 
external partners (Tas and Sunder, 2004). 
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Leveraging Vendor Interoperability 
 
Interoperability represents the ability of IT infrastructure to match and adjust to multiple 
operating needs (Chung et al., 2003). In outsourcing, the extent of interoperability is 
primarily achieved in a vendor’s IT infrastructure, through high modularity, connectivity, 
and compatibility (Byrd and Turner, 2000; Gosain et al., 2004). High interoperability is 
often enabled by advanced integration technologies or adoption of industry standards, 
such as relational databases and object-oriented technology, that minimizes component 
interdependence, maximizes functional reusability, and enhances changeability 
(Humphrey, 1989; Levina and Ross, 2003). Interoperable architectures create 
information structures that are the “glue” holding together loosely coupled parts of 
independent components. Open system architectures, such as PC-based plug-and-play 
platforms, Common Object Request Broker Architecture (CORBA), web services 
(e.g., .NET), and extendable markup language, implement a suite of interface standards 
to make software, hardware, and communications systems more compatible (Chau and 
Tam, 1997). Such technologies are inherently “future proof,” enabling vendors to build, 
modify, or apply IT quickly and appropriately in response to change (Prager, 1996; 
Gabrani et al., 2003). Carefully selecting vendors with IT platforms based on modular and 
scalable design and common compatibility and connectivity standards for high 
interoperability should help to enhance outsourcing flexibility. 
 
Dependency Diversification as a Protective Maneuver 
 
While the above maneuvers are pre-emptive in facilitating future coordination in the 
outsourcing relationship, more can be planned in advance as defensive maneuvers to 
guard against potentially damaging consequences from unexpected variations. One 
strategy is to avoid becoming overly dependent on other organizations (Alexander, 1995), 
or to minimize dependency by maintaining alternative sources for services (Thompson, 
1967). This strategy is a form of contingency planning and seeks to limit the damage 
caused by unforeseen events by affording a choice of options that may be called upon 
when necessary (Eardley et al., 1997). By the same token, Eppink (1978) invokes the 
concept of “organizational slack” to buffer an organization from environmental 
discontinuities. To this end, outsourcing organizations may diversify their dependency on 
vendors by developing both external and internal alternatives, i.e., practicing multiple 
sourcing and retaining in-house competence.  
 
Practicing Multiple Sourcing 
 
Organizations that provide scarce and critical resources acquire power in an exchange 
relationship (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). As outsourced IT and business processes are 
critical to most businesses, this is especially true of an outsourcing relationship (Kern and 
Willcocks, 2000). When an organization relies too much on an outsourcing vendor, it is 
likely to be locked into that relationship, giving the vendor little motivation to 
accommodate unanticipated changes. Outsourcing to a single vendor may thus create 
overdependence, limiting an organization’s choices in adverse situations (Currie and 
Willcocks, 1998; Saunders et al., 1997). Engaging multiple outsourcing vendors avoids 
depending too much on any single vendor. 
 
Retaining In-House Competence 
 
Gainey and Klass (2003) note that outsourcing can create significant flexibility pitfalls if 
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internal technical skills are not maintained. Such buffers, or slack resources, may not be 
cost efficient, but make perfect sense if dependency on a vendor needs to be mitigated. 
Typically, the buffer consists of a team of in-house staff performing similar tasks, helping 
an organization keep abreast of process knowledge and stay on top of changing 
technology. The in-house competence is also important as back-up to cope with 
unpredictable variations or to bring operations in-house if the vendor cannot 
accommodate changes (Lacity et al., 1995). To balance cost benefits and business agility, 
P&G continued to retain 10–15 “break-and-fix” IT people in its outsourcing deal with HP. 
 
Proactive Sensing as an Exploitive Maneuver 
 
Both pre-emptive and protective maneuvers to achieve flexibility require advanced 
planning prior to outsourcing. Exploitive maneuvers, in contrast, are activated ex post, 
and seek to help management learn as much as possible from diverse information 
sources to make the best of an outsourcing arrangement. The proactive sensing 
approach in dealing with change (Haeckel, 1999; Alexander, 1995) is consistent with 
notions such as “alertness to opportunity” or “proactive learning” (Sambamurthy et al., 
2003; Miller, 1983). In searching for meaningful signals, managers systematically look for 
early indications of new ideas, capabilities, or trends through environmental scanning and 
regular communications with outsourcing vendors. Timely sensing allows organizations 
to capitalize on such knowledge and adjust to changes quickly. Ideally, managers might 
anticipate or even instigate change, rather than merely react to it. They can nurture 
continuous innovation in outsourcing by exerting market pressure, or scanning the 
competitive landscape of outsourcing vendors (e.g., benchmarking) to strengthen their 
negotiating power. Organizations may also attempt to redefine market uncertainty by 
championing and partnering with outsourcing vendors to develop new service capabilities 
or technical advancements (Eardley et al., 1997).  
 
Reactive Adaptation as a Corrective Maneuver 
 
Enhancing reactive adaptation capacity in an outsourcing relationship is yet another 
means of ex post dynamic adjustment. Central to such quick adaptation is the ability to 
build relationships with vendors such that they are willing to align with organizations 
whatever the dynamic changes are. Such relationships involve frequent communication 
between organizational partners, development of shared goals, and cultivation of mutual 
respect (Gittell, 2002; Gupta and Goyal, 1989). Grover et al. (1996) highlight notions such 
as “relationship-specific assets” or “voluntary transactions,” i.e., organization and vendor 
mutually and sequentially demonstrate their trustworthiness as the relationship evolves 
(Blau, 1964; Emerson, 1962). A strong partnership is an important vehicle for nourishing 
flexibility when the need to respond to unexpected changes arises. 
 
In light of coordination theory, Evan’s (1991) conceptual framework thus provides a basis 
to consolidate the different maneuvers identified in the literature for managing 
outsourcing flexibility. Extending the framework, we argue that the different maneuvers 
contribute differently to the various dimensions of outsourcing flexibility: robustness, 
modifiability, new capability, and ease of exit. We elaborate on this proposition in the 
following sections.  
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Development of Research Propositions 
 
Pre-Emptive (Loose Coupling) Maneuvers and Outsourcing Flexibility 
 
Coordination theory suggests that loose coupling allows interdependencies between and 
within organizations to be managed more effectively in supporting change (March and 
Simon, 1958; Gosain et al., 2004). For minimizing customization, this argument is 
analogous to encouraging “plain vanilla” adoption of package software (e.g., ERP, CRM), 
to reduce potential problems in future maintenance and upgrades (Holland et al., 1999). 
Adhering to a vendor’s standard offerings enables an organization to leverage the 
vendor’s economies of scale, as well as its scope for scalability and adaptability, thus 
enhancing robustness. Minimal customization also simplifies the modification effort in an 
outsourcing relationship. The vendor just needs to make necessary modifications based 
on its existing technical platform, without having to understand and keep track of an 
organization’s unique requirements and specific past customization. Substantive 
customization also creates a dependent relationship, allowing the vendor to hold the 
organization “economic hostage” in future negotiations (Williamson, 1985). The ability of 
an organization to exit the outsourcing relationship, as a result, decreases because 
premature termination under such a situation becomes economically undesirable due to 
high switching costs (Ybarra and Wiersema, 1999). 
 
Proposition 1a: Lower customization is positively associated with an 
organization’s outsourcing flexibility in terms of robustness. 
 
Proposition 1b: Lower customization is positively associated with an 
organization’s outsourcing flexibility in terms of modifiability.  
 
Proposition 1c: Lower customization is positively associated with an 
organization’s outsourcing flexibility in terms of ease of exit. 
 
Similarly, high process maturity facilitates the management of flexibility in an outsourcing 
relationship. A mature process with established practices and parameterized variance 
tends to be more robust to external disturbances, as the clarity of operational rules makes 
it easy to adjust while remaining optimal. A well-understood process is also easier to 
modify because the vendor can learn about process routines with less difficulty. The 1997 
outsourcing deal between DuPont–CSC and Andersen Consulting (AC) is a case in point 
(Lacity and Willcocks, 2001). Prior to outsourcing, DuPont’s IT department consciously 
engaged in continuous improvement, significantly enhancing process maturity though 
re-engineering, value-added refocusing, and eliminating redundancy. The considerable 
process rationalization, standardization, and consolidation not only enabled more 
competitive negotiation, but also paid off in speedier handling of service and change 
requests that DuPont later enjoyed. In addition, greater process maturity also facilitates 
knowledge exchange with outsourcing vendors, making it easier for a process to be 
readily disconnected from an existing relationship and reconnected to a new one. In India, 
IT processes with CMM (Capability Maturity Model) Level 5 certification are becoming so 
common in the software outsourcing business that they are already showing sign of 
commoditization (Davenport, 2005). 
 
Proposition 2a: Higher process maturity is positively associated with an 
organization’s outsourcing flexibility in terms of robustness.  
Tan & Sia/Managing Flexibility in Outsourcing 
 
      Journal of the Association for Information Systems Vol. 7 No. 4, pp. 179-206/ April 2006 192 
Proposition 2b: Higher process maturity is positively associated with an 
organization’s outsourcing flexibility in terms of modifiability. 
 
Proposition 2c: Higher process maturity is positively associated with an 
organization’s outsourcing flexibility in terms of ease of exit.  
 
In the same vein, a highly interoperable vendor infrastructure enhances the ability of an 
outsourcing relationship to allow operational changes exceeding projected capacity 
through its ready scalability, wide compatibility, and standard connectivity among 
applications. Modifiability also improves. Change requests on existing applications may 
be handled more quickly and easily, facilitated through the reusable and modular 
architecture. Likewise, the effect of interoperability on ease of exit is expected to be 
positive. Structured data connectivity and system compatibility reduce coordination costs 
in exchanging information between partners (Chung et al., 2003). Vendors can be 
changed more readily as interface linkages are re-established across various delivery 
platforms (Alexander, 1995). An interoperable infrastructure, based on common technical 
standards, thus improves an organization’s exit flexibility. Open EDI systems or 
XML-based data interchanges, for example, facilitate coordination by reducing specificity 
in outsourcing partners and broadening the pool of available vendors (Gosain et al., 2004; 
Sanchez, 1995).  
 
Proposition 3a: High vendor interoperability is positively associated with an 
organization’s outsourcing flexibility in terms of robustness. 
 
Proposition 3b: High vendor interoperability is positively associated with an 
organization’s outsourcing flexibility in terms of modifiability. 
 
Proposition 3c: High vendor interoperability is positively associated with an 
organization’s outsourcing flexibility in terms of ease of exit. 
 
Although the pre-emptive maneuvers of minimizing customization, enhancing process 
maturity, and leveraging vendor interoperability improve outsourcing flexibility in terms of 
robustness, modifiability, and ease of exit, we argue that such maneuvers do not 
contribute to creating new capabilities. Arising from radical or “competence-destroying” 
discontinuous changes, new capabilities are not simply service-line extensions, 
geographic expansions, or technological improvements in the course of existing business 
(Govindarajan and Trimbel, 2005); they depart significantly from the existing paradigm. 
Actions and knowledge accumulated through current processes are likely to be irrelevant, 
and loose coupling only enables adaptation within the context of the current system. To 
develop new capabilities, a different form of strategic maneuver is needed.  
 
Protective (Dependency Diversification) Maneuvers and Outsourcing 
Flexibility 
 
Although contracting with multiple outsourcing vendors reduces dependency and creates 
competition among vendors, this mechanism is not without disadvantage. Gains from 
enhanced bargaining power in an outsourcing relationship may be offset by coordination 
costs and communication problems arising from managing a network of vendors. The 
primary risk is the difficulty in managing the work and relationships with several suppliers 
(Lacity et al., 1995). Cross (1995) examines this difficulty in the implementation of a 
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“framework agreement” among suppliers in the outsourcing experience of British 
Petroleum. A related problem is the diffusion of accountability and responsibility, 
particularly if the sub-processes are highly interdependent (Loh and Venkatraman, 1992; 
Huang et al., 2004). 
 
Given the high costs typically associated with multiple sourcing, we argue that such 
maneuvers are typically tapped not for routine operational issues (e.g., transaction 
fluctuation), but only to provide fallback if there is a need to exit an outsourcing 
arrangement. Resources spread across multiple vendors are generally passive, that is, 
they are not available to one another. Such maneuvers are often advocated by 
organizations to minimize switching costs, or as “exit strategies” (Emerson, 1962; Currie 
and Willcocks, 1998; Lacity and Willcocks, 2001). For example, British Petroleum 
allocated its upstream and downstream accounting processes to SEMA, Syncordia, and 
SAIC, respectively. JP Morgan signed a seven-year US$2.1 billion contract with four 
major suppliers. Competitive knowledge across multiple vendors enhanced both British 
Petroleum’s and JP Morgan’s bargaining positions, and they avoided becoming 
dependent upon a single supplier, having the alternatives to exit if necessary. Therefore, 
we argue that multiple-sourcing maneuvers are not intended to augment outsourcing 
flexibility in terms of robustness, modifiability, or new capability generation, given the 
substantial coordination required. Rather, their primary focus is to gain ease of exit when 
the need arises.  
 
Proposition 4: Multiple sourcing is positively associated with an organization’s 
outsourcing flexibility in terms of ease of exit.  
 
Similar arguments apply to retaining in-house competence as a protective flexibility 
maneuver. Given the high cost of redundancy, many organizations do not deploy purely 
idle or slack resources (e.g., maintaining a dedicated hot site to back up a data center). 
One cost-efficient practice is to segment a process into two logical sections, leaving a 
team of in-house staff to perform one section while outsourcing the other. This 
arrangement enables organizations to retain and continuously build process expertise 
(Lacity and Willcocks, 2001). Important systems knowledge and IT competence do not 
simply disappear when organizations switch vendors, or when vendors go bust. A large 
bank in Singapore outsourced the non-sensitive part of its network maintenance to IBM 
while keeping the sensitive network service in-house. Apart from security concerns, the 
main reason for segmenting the process was to preserve internal competence to prepare 
for unpredicted variations, and even back-sourcing in case of vendor non-performance. 
Such resources are not idle (e.g., staff normally have other responsibilities), they remain 
passive unless absolutely needed. They are activated as a last resort. Therefore, they 
are considered as contingency measures for ease of exit, but do not contribute to 
robustness, modifiability, or new capability generation.  
 
Proposition 5: Retaining in-house competence is positively associated with an 
organization’s outsourcing flexibility in terms of ease of exit. 
 
Exploitive (Proactive Sensing) Maneuvers and Outsourcing Flexibility 
 
Exploitive maneuvers aim to develop an organization’s ability to sense market uncertainty 
in a rapidly changing environment. Proactive sensing in outsourcing management is 
maintaining vigilance by constantly scanning the environment (e.g., the landscape of 
outsourcing vendors’ market and potential leverage on novel technology) to anticipate the 
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need to create or generate new capabilities. This requires strong managerial initiatives to 
acquire external knowledge, the boldness to adopt best practices, and a willingness to 
experiment with new ideas (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990; Teece et al., 1997).  
 
Unlike retaining in-house competence, the strategic and external orientations of proactive 
sensing maneuvers focus on information feedback outside routine operation, and hence, 
they are not expected to affect robustness or modifiability. Organizations constantly scan, 
assimilate, and leverage business intelligence to innovate, keep abreast with dynamics in 
vendors’ markets (e.g., new and alternative vendors, new possibilities in offshoring or 
opportunities for collaborative development), and quickly improvise and reconfigure their 
operations to create new capabilities before others do. An organization’s ability to 
anticipate and respond to radical change would thus depend on its management’s 
proactive sensing capability. Such forward-looking knowledge (e.g., familiarity with a 
vendor’s market, benchmarking of best practices) also keeps management vigilant about 
the performance of outsourcing vendors. The heightened awareness of alternative 
opportunities and management’s openness to assimilate new market practices will 
enhance the ease of exit in an outsourcing relationship.  
 
Proposition 6a: Proactive sensing is positively associated with an organization’s 
outsourcing flexibility in terms of new capability. 
 
Proposition 6b: Proactive sensing is positively associated with an organization’s 
outsourcing flexibility in terms of ease of exit.  
 
Corrective (Reactive Adaptation) Maneuvers and Outsourcing Flexibility 
 
Since outsourcing involves repeated inter-organizational exchanges, a sound relationship 
between an organization and its vendor is an important factor in an organization’s ability 
to adapt (Poppo and Zenger, 2002). The argument is consistent with literature in 
inter-organizational relationships indicating that a strong partnership has a positive 
impact on an organization’s ability to adjust to changing environmental demands or 
unintended problems (Gargiulo and Benassi, 2000; Ybarra and Wiersema, 1999). Rooted 
in social exchange theory (Blau, 1964), such a relationship functions as a lubricant, 
facilitating “on-the-fly” adaptation. A strong partnership with shared goals and mutual trust 
induces the vendor to accommodate requests to cope with transactional fluctuations, to 
modify existing operations, and to collaboratively create new capabilities spurred by 
radical changes. The additional “give-and-take” efforts are seen by the vendor as 
investments for longer term pay-offs as the partnership strengthens and reinforces itself 
over time. 
 
While partnership contributes to outsourcing flexibility in the traditional view of social 
capital, the embedded mutual obligations of a cohesive partnership can also become a 
liability, hindering an organization’s ability to pursue new opportunities outside the 
relationship (Portes and Sensenbrenner, 1993). The expectation of continuity that 
accompanies partnership tends to minimize parties’ motivation or preparation to exit an 
outsourcing relationship (Gupta and Goyal, 1989; Kern and Blois, 2002). Thus, we argue 
that strong partnership, as a corrective maneuver, enhances outsourcing flexibility in 
terms of robustness, modifiability, and new capability, but inhibits ease of exit.  
 
Pr0position 7a: Strong partnership is positively associated with an organization’s 
outsourcing flexibility in terms of robustness
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Table 4. Strategic Maneuvers and Dimensions of Outsourcing Flexibility 
 Robustness Modifiability New capability Ease of exit 
 
Minimize 
customization 
 
(+) 
• Standard process allows 
organization to leverage 
vendor’s economy of 
scale/scope  
• Standard process 
reduces opportunistic 
vendor behavior to hold 
organization ransom for 
process specificity 
(+) 
• Standard process reduces 
the need for knowledge 
exchange in modification 
• Standard process reduces 
opportunistic vendor 
behavior to hold organization 
ransom for process 
specificity 
N/A 
 Standard process is irrelevant 
to new innovation or 
out-of-the-box thinking in 
“competence-destroying” 
discontinuity 
 
(+) 
 Standard process reduces 
switching costs and speeds up 
transition process  
 Standard process reduces 
opportunistic vendor behavior 
to hold organization ransom for 
process specificity 
Enhance 
process 
maturity 
(+) 
 Paramaterized process 
enables easy scalability 
 Well-defined process 
facilitates routine 
adjustment and knowledge 
transfer 
(+) 
 Well-documented and 
codified routines simplify 
knowledge exchange 
between parties 
 Process rationalization, 
standardization and 
consolidation facilitate 
modification of service 
delivery  
N/A 
 Accumulated routines impose 
knowledge inertia on process 
change 
 Knowledge about matured 
process is irrelevant to new 
innovation or out-of-the-box 
thinking in 
“competence-destroying” 
discontinuity 
(+) 
 Well defined process interface 
enables loose coupling with 
vendor operation  
 Ease of knowledge transfer 
enables nimble “unplug and 
replug” in case of unfavorable 
development 
Leverage 
vendor inter- 
operability 
(+) 
 Common platform and 
interface reduce 
interdependence and 
coordination costs 
 Wider compatibility and 
connectivity enable 
process scability and 
adaptability 
(+) 
 Common platform and 
interface simplify knowledge 
exchange between parties 
 Reusable and modular 
architecture allows localized 
reconfiguration and faciliates 
functional add-ons  
N/A 
 Vendor interoperability is 
irrelevant to new innovation or 
out-of-the-box thinking in 
“competence-destroying” 
discontinuity 
 
(+) 
 Common platform and 
interface reduces specificity in 
outsourcing partners and 
broaden the pool of available 
vendors. 
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Practice 
multiple 
sourcing 
N/A 
 Resources across 
multiple vendors are 
passive and not available 
to one another for 
operational fluctuations, 
due to high coordination 
costs 
N/A 
 Resources across multiple 
vendors are passive and not 
available to one another for 
service modifications, due to 
high coordination costs 
N/A 
 Resources across multiple 
vendors are passive and not 
available to one another for 
“competence- destroying” 
innovation or creation of new 
capabilities, due to high 
coordination costs 
(+) 
 Multiple sourcing mitigates 
resource dependency on single 
vendor and reduces lock-in 
hazard  
 Competitive knowledge from 
multiple sourcing augments 
organization bargaining power 
Retain 
in-house 
competency 
N/A 
 Given the high cost of 
dedicated redundancy, 
in-house competence is a 
passive resource for 
operational fluctuations. It 
is triggered only in extreme 
situation of exiting 
outsourcing 
N/A 
 Given the high cost of 
dedicated redundancy, 
in-house competence is a 
passive resource for service 
modifications. It is triggered 
only in extreme situation of 
exiting outsourcing 
N/A 
 Given the high cost of 
dedicated redundancy, 
in-house competence is a 
passive resource for 
“competence- destroying” 
innovation or creation of new 
capabilities. It is triggered only 
in extreme situation of exiting 
outsourcing 
(+) 
 In-house competency builds 
up buffer mechanism to reduce 
dependency, hence easing exit 
in case of non-performance by 
vendors  
 
Promote 
proactive 
sensing 
N/A 
 The strategic and 
external orientations focus 
on information feedback 
outside routine operation; 
hence, are not expected to 
contribute to operatioinal 
fluctuations 
N/A 
 The strategic and external 
orientations focus on 
information feedback outside 
routine operation; hence, are 
not expected to contribute to 
service modifications 
(+) 
 Proactive sensing develops 
organization alertness to new 
opportunities and innovative 
technologies 
 Strategic, external, and open 
mindset is conducive to 
experimentation with new 
ideas 
(+) 
 Proactive sensing keeps 
management vigilant on 
performance of outsourcing 
vendor  
 Proactive sensing enables 
familiarity with vendor’s market 
and awareness of alternative 
opportunities, strengthening 
readiness to exit.  
Foster 
partnership 
quality 
(+) 
 Willingness to 
accommodate operational 
fluctuations or 
transactional variations 
based on shared goals and 
mutual trust  
(+) 
 Willingness to 
accommodate requests for 
modifications based on 
shared goals and mutual 
trust 
(+) 
 Willingness to accommodate 
requests for new capability 
based on shared goals and 
mutual trust 
(–) 
 Relational investment leads to 
expectation of business 
continuty, reducing incentives 
to exit 
 Social embeddness increases 
switching cost and inhibits the 
parties from exiting 
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Proposition 7b: Strong partnership is positively associated with an organization’s 
outsourcing flexibility in terms of modifiability. 
 
Proposition 7c: Strong partnership is positively associated with an organization’s 
outsourcing flexibility in terms of new capability.  
 
Proposition 7d: Strong partnership is negatively associated with an organization’s 
outsourcing flexibility in terms of ease of exit. 
 
Table 4 summarizes the series of our research propositions about the various strategic 
maneuvers and the different dimensions of outsourcing flexibility.  
 
Outsourcing Flexibility and Outsourcing Success 
 
The above propositions highlight the different ways to achieve flexibility in outsourcing. 
However, the impact of outsourcing flexibility on outsourcing success remains ambiguous. 
Few formal outsourcing studies have empirically investigated their relationship (Clark et 
al., 1995; Lacity and Willcocks, 2001). Indeed, the notion of flexibility is often 
indiscriminately seen as a “good thing” in the outsourcing literature (Avison et al., 1995; 
McFarlan and Nolan, 1995). Other studies simply include flexibility as one of a few 
dimensions (e.g., as responsiveness) to measure outsourcing success, typically defined 
as an organization’s satisfaction with benefits gained from outsourcing (e.g., Lee and Kim, 
1999; Grover et al., 1996). 
 
There have also been other related studies that explored the hypothesized negative 
relationship between the level of environmental uncertainty and the outcome of 
outsourcing (i.e., less successful outsourcing in volatile environments). However, the 
findings are inconclusive (Dibbern et al., 2004). Wang (2002), following transaction cost 
theory, finds a negative relationship between uncertainty and outsourcing success, but 
Poppo and Zenger (1998) contradict this.  
 
We would argue that a more complete view of the relationship between environmental 
uncertainty and outsourcing success should consider the moderating impacts of the 
flexibility attained through the strategic maneuvers that management puts in place. 
Outsourcing success is less probable in a dynamic environment of high uncertainly, as 
organizations have to constantly renegotiate with vendors to cope with the rapid and 
unpredictable changes. The outsourcing flexibility achieved through the various strategic 
maneuvers thus takes on special significance to avail alternative options or to buffer 
against unfavorable situations. 
 
These maneuvers are not free, however; they always involve additional costs, in 
unnecessary complexity, excessive coordination, or idle resources. Instituting them can 
thus be justified only when there is a strong need to manage risk and uncertainty. In times 
of low turbulence, when demand and technology are relatively static, the premium on 
outsourcing flexibility may be small. Uncertainty could have been foreseen and built into 
the outsourcing contracts. Strategic maneuvers to achieve flexibility may therefore be 
unnecessary, excessive, or even counterproductive because their costs outweigh their 
benefits, eroding the economics of successful outsourcing. Thus, we would argue that  
 
Proposition 8: Outsourcing flexibility moderates the negative relationship between 
environmental uncertainty and outsourcing success, such that it enhances outsourcing 
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success in times of high environmental uncertainty and erodes outsourcing success in 
times of low environmental uncertainty.  
 
Conclusions and Future Research 
 
This paper extends existing outsourcing research along three main avenues. First, 
integrating the various concepts of flexibility across multiple disciplines advances our 
understanding of the dimensions of flexibility in outsourcing—that is, flexibility as 
robustness, modifiability, new capability, and ease of exit. Second, recognizing that 
contracts cannot adequately manage outsourcing flexibility by themselves, the paper 
demonstrates how Evans’ (1991) archetypes of strategic maneuvers can be usefully 
employed to frame the management of flexibility in an outsourcing relationship. By 
minimizing customization, enhancing process maturity, and leveraging vendor 
interoperability, organizations can consciously put in place pre-emptive maneuvers to 
reduce tight coupling when responding to dynamic changes. Simultaneously, protective 
maneuvers, such as sourcing from multiple vendors or retaining in-house competence, 
can be planned up-front to back up outsourcing operations in extreme situations. An 
organization is also not without options once an outsourcing contract is sealed. Exploitive 
maneuvers can be instituted through proactive sensing to enhance management 
alertness to take advantage of emerging changes and opportunities. Flexibility can also 
be attained by strengthening an organization’s ability to adapt reactively, through a closer 
partnership with outsourcing vendors. 
 
Last but not least, we strive to populate this framework by consciously surfacing 
maneuvers of flexibility management that have strong theoretical foundations and 
empirical research in the outsourcing literature. We elaborate the characteristics of these 
maneuvers, and put forth propositions about their relationships to different dimensions of 
outsourcing flexibility. We also highlight that these strategic maneuvers are costly, and 
suggest a positive moderating impact on outsourcing success only in high environmental 
uncertainty.  
 
As shown in Figure 3, the strategic maneuver framework thus provides a holistic view of 
managing flexibility in outsourcing, enabling organizations to consider a portfolio of 
maneuvers that best meets their needs.  
 
Managers should consider the level of environmental uncertainty and clarify the 
dimensions of flexibility they seek in an outsourcing relationship, as various maneuvers 
contribute to each dimension differently. Minimizing customization and enhancing 
process maturity, for example, are irrelevant to “out-of-the-box” thinking to develop new 
capabilities in outsourcing. Similarly, while partnership quality enhances outsourcing 
flexibility in terms of robustness, modifiability, and new capability, the social 
embeddedness of a tight partnership diminishes an organization’s ease of exit.  
 
We hope to set the stage for research on managing flexibility in outsourcing. In addition to 
empirically validating the various research propositions, future research may also explore 
the archetypes of strategic maneuvers as a portfolio, depending on some pertinent 
contingencies. For example, contrasting the portfolio of maneuvers in outsourcing 
between stable and dynamic business environments may tease out the relative 
deployment of contractual provision, and the portfolio of pre-emptive, protective, 
exploitive, and corrective maneuvers. Typically, in high-tech industries, the fast pace of 
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Figure 3. Research Model on Management of Outsourcing Flexibility 
 
change may place a premium on exploitive maneuvers to proactively leverage emerging 
opportunities; in stable industries, contractual provision or pre-emptive maneuvers are 
fundamental to lay out or prepare for possible, and often predictable, alternatives. 
Similarly, one would expect the portfolio of maneuvers to differ across business 
processes with different degrees of structure (e.g., comparing different types of IT 
outsourcing, or contrasting payroll outsourcing and financial advisory outsourcing).  
 
Future research may also pursue the relationships among the strategic maneuvers to 
achieve outsourcing flexibility. Although the hallmark of a flexible response is the 
juxtaposition of several parallel actions, Evans (1991) also points out that ex ante 
strategic postures (pre-emptive and protective maneuvers) must be in place for reactive 
or responsive (exploitive and corrective) maneuvers to be successful. This suggests that 
advanced structuring also affects the execution of ex post adjustments. Organizations 
have limited capacity to adapt to changes after the fact, as earlier decisions can constrain 
organizational discretion later. The structure of exploitive maneuvers, which the 
outsourcing literature has largely overlooked, also deserves greater research attention. 
Such proactive sensing to exploit uncertainty seems to synergize well with protective 
maneuvers, as it could leverage common resources that build both in-house competence 
and industry knowledge derived from multi-sourcing practices.  
 
Finally, clarifying the various maneuvers allows us to see the value of IT to facilitate 
flexibility management in outsourcing. Consistent with Boynton (1993), Quinn and Baily 
(1994), and Kogut and Kulatilaka (1994), we believe that IT establishes an 
inter-organizational business infrastructure that shapes a firm’s capacity to launch and 
deliver various outsourced services. IT can enable external scanning, proactive sensing, 
seamless communication in relationship building, and capturing or digitizing work 
routines to enhance process maturity. Yet, as a delivery infrastructure, it has to be 
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sufficiently flexible itself, that is, scalable, modular, and interoperable. Current research in 
flexible IT infrastructure, such as service-oriented architecture (e.g., Brown and Hagel, 
2003) and agile software development (e.g., Larmen, 2003), should lend important 
perspectives to managing flexibility in outsourcing.  
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